Downfall: The End of Putin’s Russia — Part III
More on the subject of Putin’s rise and fall, including his history of deflecting blame and criticism in defense of war crimes and human rights abuses.
Welcome back! In the previous installments, I reviewed Putin’s rise to power and how he went about eliminating all opposition to his rule, systematically dismantling Russia’s democratic institutions, denying human rights, and attempting to restore Soviet and Imperial Russia-era traditions. If you’ve made it this far, I commend you on your openness of mind and fortitude of stomach.
However, that may not last with this installment. Today, I hope to address some of Moscow’s most infamous claims, which happen to be favorite talking points among their apologists and those who claim the “official narrative” about the war is the result of a Western media bias. I am referring, of course, to the argument that Russia was “provoked” into this war by NATO expansion or meddling in Ukraine, and that supporting Ukraine will mean WW3.
Despite their inherent popularity, these arguments are intellectually and morally bankrupt. Allow me to explain…
NATO Expansion
To be fair, NATO has expanded considerably since the end of the Cold War. The expansion took place in spurts, with multiple members being added in 1999 and 2004, followed by the ascension of individual states between 2009 and 2020. In fact, as of 2022, fourteen former Soviet Republics and members of the Warsaw Pact successfully petitioned NATO for membership, including:
- The Czech Republic (Czechia), Poland, Hungary (1999)
- Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia (2004)
- Albania, Croatia (2009)
- Montenegro (2017)
- North Macedonia (2020)
Anyone familiar with Putin’s declarations and policies over the years is intimately familiar with how he feels about NATO’s expansion. But here’s the thing. NATO membership is petitioned, meaning that states need to ask to join, and then contribute to the common defense of its members. This has been standard practice for NATO since its inception in 1949, which was founded to prevent further Soviet expansion into Europe after incidents like the Iran Crisis of 1946 and the Berlin Blockade in 1948.
The fact that former SSRs, nations with a long history of being invaded and occupied by Russian forces (and ruled by Russian puppets), wanted to join NATO shortly after toppling their Soviet-backed governments speaks volumes. One would get the impression that they were looking for protection against future Russian aggression. What’s more, the last time NATO expanded eastward was 2004, a decade before the Russian-Ukrainian crisis began, which was when the Baltic States were admitted to the fold.
Russia naturally raised objections and made all kinds of threats to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. However, these threats proved immaterial and were consistent with Russia’s long history of threatening and posturing with the Baltic states. Meanwhile, none of these states were equipped with nuclear weapons, missile defense capabilities, or were ever in any position to threaten Russia with a land invasion.
While a NATO presence in the Baltic has been a strain on relations, NATO also avoided admitting Finland, Sweden, and Ukraine throughout this period for fear of “provoking Russia.” This is especially true of Ukraine, which has sought NATO membership since 2014. In spite of the Russian invasion, NATO and the U.S. still refuse to commit to admitting Ukraine or adopting a timetable for entry.
And while NATO has admittedly played a little fast and loose with its promise to not “expand to Russia’s doorstep,” it has also taken steps to maintain and improve relations with post-Soviet Russia. This includes the creation of the Partnership for Peace program, which Russia joined in 1994. In 1997, Russia, the U.S., and 15 other nations signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (NRFA).
The purpose of the NRFA was to “deepen and widen the scope of NATO-Russian relations, primarily to offset the largely negative impact on those relations caused by NATO’s decision to enlarge.” The act led to the creation of the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (NRPJC) — renamed the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 — which facilitated multiple agreements and joint projects between Russia and NATO until 2014.
Unfortunately, these efforts were strained as Russia continually threatened its neighbors, violated its agreements in Syria, invaded Georgia, and sponsored “frozen conflicts” in neighboring states. But the official break came in 2014 when Russia invaded Crimea and declared it part of Russia. In October 2021, following the expulsion of eight Russian officials from NATO’s headquarters of Brussels, Russia suspended its mission to NATO and ordered the closure of the NATO office in Moscow.
What’s more, NATO membership worked out well for the many countries that joined between 1999 and 2006. According to a study by Professor Rachel A. Epstein (International Relations and European Politics, Josef Korbel School of International Studies) that appeared in the journal Security Studies:
“In the 1990s, critics warned that the 1999 NATO enlargement would cultivate a new cold war and prove irrelevant to democratic consolidation in central Europe. Events have not borne out these forecasts, however. In Poland, not only did NATO build a civilian consensus in favor of democratic control over the armed forces corresponding to NATO norms, but it also delegitimized Polish arguments for defense self-sufficiency that had derived their credibility from Poland’s experience of military vulnerability and foreign domination. Such democratizing and denationalizing trends have contributed to stability in postcommunist Europe.”
In short, NATO membership has not only been favored by democratically-elected governments in former Soviet satellites. It has also contributed to the democratization of newly-admitted members. When it comes to Russia’s allies, the opposite has been the case. In fact, Putin’s agenda in keeping neighboring countries in Russia’s orbit has been as much about repressing democracy as it has preventing NATO expansion.
What’s His Real Beef?
As I addressed in the previous installment, Putin’s government has a long history of intervening in neighboring country’s politics to ensure that their leaders remain closely aligned with Russia. This includes hiking up the prices of Russian natural gas and petroleum, which these nations rely on, then leveraging their debts to exact concessions. Even more pronounced is the way they back pro-Russian rulers and make sure that democratic opposition is crushed.
When pro-Russian candidates lost their hold on power and democratically-elected governments sought closer ties with the EU, Putin sent in the troops to occupy and/or break off sections of the countries and installed pro-Russian dictators. This includes occupying Chechnya (1999), breaking South Ossetia and Abkhazia off from Georgia (2008), breaking off Crimea from Ukraine (2014), Donetsk and Luhansk from Ukraine (2014-present), and of course, invading Ukraine (2022).
In all cases, Putin has claimed that these actions were in response to “terrorism” or the mistreatment of ethnic Russians. Not only has the UN Human Rights Council, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch repeatedly documented human rights abuses and war crimes committed by Russia and its allies in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine, they’ve also documented brutal repression, persecution of minorities, and ethnic cleansing committed by Russian-backed governments.
And for the record, Putin’s constant insistence that Russians are being mistreated by neighboring countries (as a justification for invading them) is categorically no different than Hitler’s insistence that Germans were being mistreated by Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1938 and 1939. In both cases, this was a preamble to invasions that ultimately led to World War II and the death of 70 million people. Similarly, Hitler’s invasions were preceded by promises that he was committed to peace — much like Putin’s promise that he wouldn’t invade Ukraine (right before he did!)
Moreoever, Putin’s own human rights record when it comes to the treatment of Russian citizens stands in stark contrast to his professed concern for ethnic Russians living in neighboring states. Much like Putin’s concerns about “NATO aggression,” these claims hide the real intention. Consider Chechnya, a breakaway republic that won its independence in 1996. Shortly thereafter, Chechen fighters began traveling to neighboring Dagestan to assist its independence movement fight the Russians.
If Dagestan were to break free as well, Russia would lose control and access to key areas in the oil and gas-rich Caucasus and along the Caspian Sea. This was made all the more pressing considering that Russia was dealing with major economic problems because of the financial crisis that happened a year before. All that was needed was a pretext. And for Putin and the FSB, a false flag operation that left 300 Russian civilians dead and 1000 wounded (which they blamed on Chechen terrorists) delivered it.
Russia’s objections to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia joining NATO reflected similar concerns. Shortly after military cooperation ceased with these countries, and they began seeking closer ties to Europe, Russia stood to lose access to the Baltic Sea. In addition, the invasion of Georgia, which led to the creation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, also ensured that Russia could maintain access to a vital port in the Black Sea — the 7th Military Base in Bombora, Abkhazia.
And when Yanukovych fled Kyiv amid the Euromaidan protests, Putin’s response was to send in the Wagner group to seize control of the naval base in Sevastopol. In 2010, Yanukovych had extended Russia’s lease on this base until 2042 in exchange for a break on natural gas prices. In short, it was also about maintaining Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea. Breaking off the Crimean peninsula (largely populated by ethnic Russians who wouldn’t object) was merely a bonus.
Far from fearing an invasion or worrying about the fate of Russian civilians, Putin’s main concern has always been the loss of military facilities that allow him to flex Russia’s military muscle abroad. Countries that join NATO are much harder to intimidate or bully, hence why Russia has resorted to threats of violence whenever any of its traditional satellites have considered joining. It’s also why Russian-sponsored conflicts, or an invasion by Russian forces, inevitably result.
Much like how Putin’s opponents keep winding up dead, countries that defy Russia have a way of ending up invaded, broken up, and ruled by pro-Russian puppet dictators.
Escalation and WW3
Lastly, the very idea that Russia fears NATO on its doorstep because they’re likely to invade is laughable. Despite the rather decrepit state of their armed forces (as the invasion revealed) Russia is still sitting on the largest nuclear arsenal in the world — 5,889 nuclear warheads as of 2023. Any attempt at invading the country would result in immediate nuclear escalation and mutual destruction. It’s for this very reason that Putin’s aggression towards Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 was met with trepidation and fear from the West.
It’s also why the U.S. and chief NATO members took as long as they did to commence shipments of offensive weaponry — which remain modest, still. According to various estimates, Ukraine now rivals Russia in terms of the number of tanks its deployed. However, the vast majority are Soviet-era weapons that lack the sophistication, armor protection, advanced optics, and anti-tank capabilities of NATO main battle tanks (MBTs). To date, the U.S. and NATO have only provided Ukraine with 14 Challenger 2s, 14 Leopard 2s, and 31 yet-to-be-delivered Abrams tanks.
The U.S. has also provided Ukraine with only two Patriot missile systems, which have provided exceptional protection against Russia’s Kinzhal missiles, but only around Kyiv. All other major cities are undefended against Russian missile attacks. It also took months of Ukrainian victories in the field before Washington and Brussels were willing to commit to sending Multiple Rocket Launch Systems (MRLS), but with the caveat that they be used on targets within occupied territories (i.e., not Russia).
All the while, the Biden administration and NATO have been reluctant to commit to Ukraine’s desire for full NATO membership. At the recent NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, the U.S. and its NATO allies pledged continued support for Ukraine, but refused to clear a path for their membership or even commit to a timetable for their entry. Clearly, NATO takes the threat of escalation and nuclear brinkmanship very seriously.
Putin knows this too, which is why he keeps threatening to launch nukes if Russia is invaded. Not being suicidal or a complete idiot, he also knows he can’t preemptively launch a nuclear strike, otherwise every nuclear power on the planet would come together and turn their nuclear arsenals toward Russia. Not only that, but the U.S., NATO, China, India, and many others would mobilize their armed forces and prepare to invade Russia. At that point, Putin would be faced with two options: unconditional surrender, or watch Russia burn!
Hence why he’s bluffing, because it’s all he can do. It’s like a man waving a gun around in a room filled with armed people. No one wants it to become a shoot-out, so they try to keep him calm. But the second he pulls the trigger, everyone in the room will draw and fill him full of holes. Ergo, as long as Putin doesn’t launch a nuke, he can continue to make threats and people will continue to avoid doing anything too provocative.
And given that the result of a nuclear launch would be the total annihilation of Russia, no one in the Kremlin is stupid enough to let Putin authorize such a thing. Moreover, Putin can’t simply “push the button” and let the nukes fly, as many people tend to believe. Much like in the U.S., there is no red button on the president’s desk. Russia employs a “nuclear briefcase” (called Cheget), which requires the president to enter the proper launch codes.
These codes are transmitted to the General Staff, who initiate the launch by passing the codes to the missile silos and nuclear submarines. In short, if the General Staff says no, the launch does not proceed. Its also worth noting that the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff are also issued Chegets, and its even been suggested that authorization is required by at least one of these two individuals —i.e., you need two out of three Chegets to authorize a launch!
The only option Putin has would be to order a tactical nuclear strike from one of the mobile launchers in the field. Putin claims to have already sent some to Belarus, but any order to launch them would have to be approved by the generals in the field. Once again, Putin cannot unilaterally make this decision and even if he has lost all connection to reality, his generals have not. They know what the consequences of going nuclear would be and that they would likely involve Russia being turned into glass.
To put it simply, if his generals suspected for one second that Putin had gone crazy and was preparing to go nuclear, they would drag him into the street and shoot him in the back of the head. Or, they might see to it he falls “suddenly ill” and has to be disappeared from the Kremlin. Putin knows this too, which is likely why he’s become increasingly isolated and paranoid since his invasion began to go south on him. He fears a knife in the back because he knows he’s vulnerable.
It’s also why he’s been doing more house cleaning since the war began. In 2022–2023, 38 Russian oligarchs and officials with ties to Putin’s administration suffered suspicious deaths, all of whom were apparent critics of the war. The circumstances in each case match Putin’s MO perfectly, where a Putin critic became “suddenly ill,” fell from a high-rise apartment or hotel, or were found dead with a suicide note on their person.
The problem has become so acute that it has earned a nickname “Sudden Russian Death Syndrome.” What’s more, its eliminating the very people Putin used to maintain his hold on power. As the “Wagner Rebellion” demonstrated, Putin’s penchant for eliminating former allies who become outspoken critics is causing blowback. His circle of trusted cronies is collapsing, making him more isolated, vulnerable, and ripe for overthrow.
Ergo, people who entertain the idea that aiding Ukraine will make nuclear war inevitable (or that anyone wants such a thing) are either severely misinformed or deliberately lying. For Russian propaganda outlets and troll farms, the fear of World War 3 is nothing more than a cheap and easy way of discouraging support for Ukraine. Hence why it is so popular and oft-repeated. But it deliberately hides the fact that Russia would have the most to lose, and why it is therefore so unlikely.
Thus ends Part III. Stay tuned for the Conclusion, coming soon!
