“Russia will win the war,” another Kremlin favorite!

18 min readAug 26, 2023

Part three of my examination of Russia’s propaganda, wherein we examine the claims that victory for Russia is somehow inevitable.

As promised, I’m back with another popular talking point favored by the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin sources. Last time, I tackled the factually-challenged claim that Russia has been winning this war since it’s inception. The counter-arguments that I hope were made clear is that you clearly aren’t winning when the following takes place:

Multiple failed offensives
Hasty and chaotic retreats
Media spin (“we meant do to that!”)
Conscription Crises (plural)
Resorting to untrained soldiers, mercenaries, and obsolete equipment

All five apply in Russia’s case. From the beginning of the war, Putin’s “limited military operation,” which he suspected would be a cake walk involving no more than a few days of operations, has been an unmitigated disaster. Unable to admit defeat and fearing a knife in the back, Putin has had to resort to increasingly desperate and totalitarian measures to keep the war going and maintain his hold on power.

And yet, his apologists and propaganda organs now claim that through this desperation and the mobilization of countless untrained, unwilling, and unprepared soldiers is precisely how he’s going to win this war. This, and other talking points addressed so far, have given new meaning to what Fyodor Dostoevsky famously said:

“A man who lies to himself, and believes his own lies, becomes unable to recognize truth, either in himself or in anyone else.”

Allow me to explain, in detailed form, why this argument (i.e., Russia will win) is a indefensible claim (both logically and morally).

Attrition for the Win

Since the immense losses and setbacks Russia has suffered during the first year of the war, stalemate has set in along a front measuring about 1,000 km (660 mi) from the northeastern part of Kharkiv Oblast to the Crimea in the south. Russia made minor gains around the town of Bakhmut — suffering 60,000+ casualties vs. 20,000 Ukrainian casualties — while Ukraine’s long-awaited second counteroffensives has made small gains in multiple sectors.

At this juncture, many analysts are claiming that the war has entered its “attrition phase” where both sides are merely battling it out, strength against strength, and any hopes for achieving a breakthrough or restoring mobility are not possible. For this reason, many on the pro-Russia side claim that the advantage now lies with Russia, given its larger population.

On its face, this is not an entirely outlandish assumption. In a war of attrition, having more bodies generally means the ability to fight longer. But that is hardly the only factor involved, otherwise Russia would have easily defeated Japan in 1904–05, Germany in World War I, and Afghanistan in 1979–89. In all three cases, a war of attrition resulted in the defeat of Russia and violent revolution. The latter two examples saw the ruling dynasties (the Romanovs and the Community Party) overthrown.

To break it down succinctly, winning a war of attrition is not just about numbers. You need to make sure you have the ability to field and equip your troops. You also need the commitment of your nation’s industry and access to resources (financial and otherwise), the backing of your people, and a favorable kill-loss ratio. As I intend to show, Russia is short on all counts.

Mobilization

As any commander worth their pay knows, war is not a simple matter of mathematical calculations or symbols on a map. Warfare is a human endeavor and is often determined by psychological and emotional factors. To put it another way, a country with a numerical advantage cannot make that count unless it is able to mobilize its people for total war. This requires unity, commitment, and a willingness on the part of its people to keep fighting.

Already, Russia has experienced serious problems recruiting its citizens to fight in what is increasingly seen as a desperate struggle with no purpose. In September 2022, Russia conducted a “partial mobilization” to raise 300,000 troops, which led to the exodus of close to 700,000 Russian citizens. Since the war began, the number of emigres is estimated to be somewhere between several hundred thousand to several million, many of whom are young, able-bodied, and educated — the very people Russia needs the most for this war!

In January 2023, it was reported that Russia began a second round of mobilization, this time to raise 500,000 troops. This raised fears that Russia might attempt a “general mobilization,” where every able bodied man aged 18 to 27 would be drafted and sent to the front. These sentiments were echoed by Mikhail Sheremet, a Putin-ally in the lower state Duma. On April 17th, he stated in an interview with the The Moscow Times that it was the only way for Russia to win the war:

“There must be a general mobilization. We must fight ‘with the whole world,’ as they say, and everyone must feel their belonging together with the country.”

However, a general mobilization is sure to trigger another mass migration, much larger than the last one. Putin and his lieutenants know this, which is why they have very carefully avoided using these words “general mobilization” and have been taking a slower, subtler approach. This includes commuting the sentences of convicts who enlist to fight, extending the age of conscription from 27 to 30, and cracking down on draft-dodgers.

A country with a numerical advantage cannot make that count unless it is able to mobilize its people for total war.

Also, a nation at war needs to ensure it has a steady source of resources and raw materials so it can manufacture all the weapons and supplies it needs to keep the war going. Whereas Ukraine is benefiting from military, financial, and logistical support from the richest countries in the world, Russia has only two committed allies — Iran and North Korea, two “rogue states” — and has been widely sanctioned and embargoed, leading to the collapse of the ruble.

Real Numbers

Those who argue that Russia will win in a war of attrition base this argument on one factor alone: “Russia has more people.” This is certainly true. According to Worldometer, an online real-time statistics source, Russia’s prewar population was 144,713,314, whereas Ukraine’s was 39,701,739. That’s a 3.6:1 advantage. But those numbers count for very little if a country is unable to mobilize, equip, and train its people. And in this war, Ukrainian forces have had all those advantages in the field.

In 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) consisted of 700,000 active personnel and over 1 million reservists. Meanwhile, Russia’s initial invasion force consisted of 130,000 soldiers, and its reservists had not yet been called up to action. In an attempt to make good on its losses, Russia has attempted two mobilization drives to raise an addition 300,000 and 500,000 troops, respectively. Alas, this merely sent untrained conscripts into the field who were no match for their counterparts, and led to widespread resistance at home.

Russia may have more people, but it can only field so many troops. And its conscription drives are not only sending poorly-trained troops to the front, they’re having a disastrous effect on morale.

Ukraine’s current military budget is roughly $30.8 billion, with over $100 billion in foreign military aid (totaling $131 billion) while Russia has a military budget of $86.4 billion and receives virtually nothing in military aid (the price of having so few allies!) Here too, Russia is at a disadvantage in a key respect: it cannot finance the war to the same tune as Ukraine and its allies.

In May 2023, the Institute for the Study of War released a report where, among other things, they assessed the troops strength of the two combatants in the field. According to their tallies, Russia had roughly 300,000 soldiers and private military contractors (aka. mercenaries) deployed to Ukraine. In contrast, Ukraine had an estimated 700,000 personnel, including front line troops, reservists, and volunteers.

Once again, numbers only count if you can put them in the field! Ukraine maintains this advantage because, unlike Russia, it is fighting a defensive war and on home turf.

We Stand United (…or not!)

In addition to the migrations, Russia has experienced massive waves of protests since the war began. Between February 24th and March 2nd, police arrested over 6,500 people in 53 cities across the country; and by March 6th, that number reached more than 13,500 people. However, things took a turn when Putin announced the first round of mobilization.

On 21 September, the Youth Democratic Movement (Vesna) called for country-wide demonstrations, resulting in mass rallies across the country. Only 2000 people were arrested this time around, as security forces generally resorted to firing live ammo into the air to break up the crowds. By the end of the year, more than 20,000 people were in jail for protesting the war and subjected to repressive conditions.

An Amnesty International Report issued in July 2023 documented multiple instances of harassment, intimidation, and the misuse of “foreign agent” legislation to prosecute dissent:

“Repression in Russia runs deep where a complex and extensive range of tactics are increasingly being weaponized to silence anti-war dissent. Peaceful protesters against the war in Ukraine and those who share critical information about the Russian armed forces face severe criminal, administrative and other sanctions.
“New, absurd laws that criminalize those who freely express their views have been adopted and immediately put to use. The flawed criminal justice system, characterized by deeply unfair trials, has been deployed to dish out prison sentences and hefty fines to silence critics in response to slightest dissent.”

There’s also the overlap with Russia’s drafting of convicts, which is also used to intimidate anti-war demonstrators. This has had the desired effect, as men know that if they arresting for protesting the war, they will be sent directly to the front. Nevertheless, the anti-war movement persists as an underground movement that now employs more subtle tactics to get its point across.

And who can forget the Wagner coup, where former Putin ally and go-to mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin broke with his boss and began marching on Moscow? After Putin allegedly tried to have him killed for voicing criticism for the war effort, Prigozhin officially launched an insurrection that got within 200 km (~125 mi) of Moscow. This development was a PR nightmare for Putin, as Russian forces were unable to stop their rapid advance and the coup only ended due to the intervention of Belarusian president Lukashenko*.

A country with a numerical advantage cannot make that count unless it is able to mobilize its people for total war.

As these examples all demonstrate, Russia is hardly united nor is its population committed to this war. Putin knows this too, hence why he’s become increasingly isolated, fearful of his own lieutenants, and resorted to purging his former allies-turned-critics. This includes the 15 generals and senior military officers who have been demoted, fired, or murdered, and the 42 oligarchs who have died of “Sudden Russian Death Syndrome” (SRDS).

Addendum: As I was writing this, I learned that Prigozhin and nine other passengers have reportedly died after his private jet was shot down north of Moscow. SRDS strikes again!

Meanwhile, Ukrainians have been united behind Zelensky and shown that they are committed to fighting this war until all of Ukraine is liberated. This was made evident by the way people who fled the country during the invasion are returning to fight and Ukraine’s mobilization efforts. While these have been difficult and tested the social fabric of Ukraine, they did not trigger widespread protests or result in mass migrations. There’s also the success that expatriate Ukrainians have had mobilizing aid and support abroad.

Quality vs. Quantity

Another reality concerning a war of attrition is that numbers count for very little if the soldiers being sent to the front are poorly trained, poorly-equipped, and simply being thrown at the enemy as cannon fodder. This is something Russia has struggled with historically, and it was a crucial factor as to why they’ve either lost wars or suffered such terrible defeats (the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, Operation Barbarossa and Case Blue).

The general lack of quality in terms of Russia’s soldiers and equipment has been clear since the beginning of this war. During the initial invasion, Russian troops were plagued by equipment failures, logistical problems, and were forced to abandon their vehicles in the field. Putin placed the blame on Gen. Dmitry Bulgakov, who ran the military’s logistics operations since 2008, but had apparently embezzled funds earmarked for equipment spending.

However, these failures focused attention on the corruption and poor leadership in Putin’s government. Despite this early indication of poor quality, the situation has not changed as Russian troops continue to be plagued by supply issues. In May 2023, the British Defense Ministry released a Defense Intelligence report where they noted poor training and equipment among Russian reservists that were mobilized the previous September:

“On paper, the Russian Combined Grouping of Forces (CGF) in Ukraine is similarly organised to the invasion force of 446 days ago. It still likely consists of over 200,000 personnel organised into around 70 combat regiments and brigades divided into five Groups of Forces. It still struggles with limited freedom to conduct air operations.
“However, in February 2022 it consisted of professional soldiers; was largely equipped with reasonably modern vehicles; and had been regularly exercised, aspiring to complex, joint operations. Now the force is mostly poorly trained mobilised reservists and increasingly reliant on antiquated equipment, with many of its units severely under-strength.
“It routinely only conducts very simple, infantry-based operations. Critically, it is unlikely that CGF has been able to generate a large, capable, mobile reserve to respond to emerging operational challenges. It is unlikely to be an organisation which will effectively cohere large-scale military effect along the 1,200 km front line under stress.”

Shortly thereafter, General Arthur Milley addressed the question of differences between Ukraine’s and Russia’s leadership. FTR, Gen. Milley is someone whom the apologist crowd love to cite (to me, anyway) in order to justify their claims that Russia is winning. In June, during a press conference at NATO HQ in Brussels, he praised Ukraine’s leadership as its second counteroffensive began.

Numbers count for very little if the soldiers being sent to the front are poorly trained, poorly-equipped, and simply being thrown at the enemy as cannon fodder.

He also drew a sharp distinction with Russia’s leadership, which he said was “not necessarily coherent, their troops’ morale is not high, and they’re sitting in defensive positions and many of them don’t even know why they’re there.” There’s also the contrast in training, which Milley also addressed during the same press conference. Throughout the war, NATO has not only been sending military aid, but has offered its facilities and personnel to train Ukrainian recruits.

“All in all, international effort has trained almost 60,000 Ukrainian soldiers for this current operation, many of whom are engaged in close combat,” he said. “More than 6,000 Ukrainians are being trained right now at 40 different locations — training locations in 65 courses in 33 nations on three continents.”

Putin’s decision to pull tanks out of storage has not aided the situation either. Russia’s invasion force was equipped with Russia’s most modern vehicles, including T-90, T-80, and upgraded T-72 tanks — all of which were built late in the Cold War or during the 2000s. But a few months into the war, after Russian tank losses had reached an estimated 700, Putin ordered that older T-62 and T-55 battle tanks be pulled out of storage to replace them.

After a year into the war, Russian tanks losses were estimated to be as high as 50%. In response, Putin ordered that even older tanks, obsolete T-54s and T-55s, be pulled from storage and even from museums to compensate. As their designations suggest, these tanks were designed and built in the 1950s and are recieving minimal upgrades before being shipped off to th front.

When the war began, Ukraine had an estimated 2,250 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), the lion’s share (roughly 800) of which were Soviet-era T-64B and T-64BM tanks. But they’ve benefited from the 548 Russian tanks they’ve managed to seize from Russian crews. They’ve also benefited immensely from tank shipments of late-Cold War and 21st century tanks from their NATO allies. All told, the number that have delivered and pledged so far include:

500+ T-72M1s, T-72M1Rs, PT-91 Twardys, T-72 Avengers
270 Leopard 1As
130 Leopard 2s
31 A1 Abrams
14 Challenger 2

As the quality of Russia’s fighting force continues to grow poorer, Ukraine’s continues to improve. This is not a recipe for victory, but for grinding defeat. What’s more, it reflects the strategic tone of the war, where Russian forces went launching offensives (Feb — Aug 2022) and dealing with counterattacks (Aug — Nov 2022) to fighting to a stalemate (Nov — June 2023) and adopting a defensive posture (June 2023 — present). Their fortunes have been reversed, and with it, any chance of winning the war outright.

Replacements

This raises another important issue. Attrition is only sustainable if you can manufacture a steady supply of weapons to replace those you lost. Almost from inception, Russia has had a very hard time meeting battlefield demands for replacement weapons and equipment. Instead of providing troops with newly-build tanks and vehicles of modern design, they’ve resorting to pulling older ones out of mothballs. But that hasn’t helped matter since they’ve been losing them about as fast as they can deploy them.

According to the latest estimates from the online tracking site Oryx, Russia’s tank losses now stand at 2,263 — roughly two-thirds of what they began the invasion with! This highlights yet another problem. Compare that to Ukraine, which has lost 624 tanks since the war began, but has managed to replace most of them with captured Russian tanks. And of course, there’s the deliveries of upgraded Soviet-era and modern NATO MBTs. According to data published by the Kiel Institute, 471 of these have been delivered (as of early July) and a further 286 are due to arrive.

Thanks to these shipments and Ukraine’s own efforts to field replacements, Ukrainian forces have achieved parity with Russia in terms of tanks for the first time since the war began. So while Russia has seen half of its tank forces wiped out, Ukraine has increased its tank strength since the war began. For an invading army, which is dependent on being able to field more weapons designed for offensive operations, this is not a sign of impending victory!

Attrition is only sustainable if you can manufacture a steady supply of weapons to replace those you lost.

Beyond tanks, Ukraine’s allies have also dispatched thousands of Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs), Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), tens of thousands of rifles, missiles, artillery shells, flak vests, and other assorted equipment. The most recent high-profile deal consisted of the U.S. agreeing to send shipments of F-16 Falcon multi-role fighters to help Ukraine establish air superiority.

Proportionate Losses

When fighting a war where it’s entirely about strength against strength to see who will collapse first, you need to make sure your rate of attrition is better than the enemies! It’s not enough to simply have more troops if you’re kill to loss ratio is disproportionately high. As noted, it also doesn’t help if you can’t supply your troops with proper equipment or training.

As noted, Ukraine has had a numerical advantage since the onset of the war, and is able to field reinforcements with greater ease since mass mobilization began right away and it takes far less time to ship reinforcements to the front for them. In addition, Ukraine has averaged a 2:1 ratio against Russian soldiers since the war began.

According to official Pentagon documents leaked back in April, between 43,000 and 47,000 Russian troops have been killed in action (KIA) while a total of over 220,000 have been KIA, captured, wounded, or declared missing. The same documents indicated that Ukraine has suffered 124,500–131,000 total casualties, including 15,500–17,500 KIA. This amounts to a 2:1 advantage in terms of overall casualties, but a 3:1 in terms of military deaths.

This demonstrates two salient realities. Not only are Russian losses substantially higher, but they also lack (or simply aren’t providing) the medical care needed to care for their wounded. This was confirmed by Artem Katulin, the founder and head of the Kalashnikov Concern Training Center for Tactical Medicine in Moscow. During an interview with the pro-Kremlin RIA Novosti news agency in April of 2023, he said that the state of medical care in the warzone was “sad”:

“More than 30% of amputations were performed due to incorrect application of a tourniquet, more than 50% of all deaths did not occur from life-threatening injuries… We have regular first aid kits, but most fighters try to use ‘sponsored’ first aid kits or those that they have collected on their own. An average quality first aid kit includes about 20 components, only four or five of them are produced in Russia. The rest is China, often uncertified products.”

In any war, the ability to evacuate the wounded, patch them up, and get them back to the front is absolutely crucial. If soldiers know that they will be left to die in the field, they’re far less likely to risk their lives. As it stands, Ukraine is losing less troops, saving more, and is not suffering from the same logistical issues Russians are. And whereas Russian conscripts are being sent in with minimal training, Ukrainian draftees are receiving comprehensive training in NATO countries.

When fighting a war where it’s entirely about strength against strength to see who will collapse first, you need to make sure your rate of attrition is better than the enemies!

Now let’s consider vehicles, which includes tanks, AFVs, IFVs, APCs, helicopters, fighters, etc. Again, Oryx has been providing up-to-date and detailed tallies on equipment losses since the war began. Here are the latest figures and how they break down:

Russia Losses:

Total: 11,843 (8,062 destroyed/471 damaged/442 abandoned/2,867 captured)
Tanks: 2,263 (1,458/129/130/548)
AFVs: 953 (623/26/37/267)
IFVs: 2,695 (1834/107/144/609)
APCs: 344 (229/9/15/91)
Self-Propelled Artillery: 504 (361/29/7/107)
Towed Artillery: 287 (162/24/5/96)
Multiple Rocket Launchers: 256 (187/15/2/52)
Aircraft: 85 (77 destroyed/8 damaged)
Helicopters: 103 (89 destroyed/12 damaged/2 captured)

Ukraine Losses:

Total losses: 4,237 (2829/324/145/939)
Tanks: 626 (401/51/31/143)
AFVs: 309 (216/5/8/80)
IFVs: 702 (492/45/49/115)
APCs: 328 (193/24/20/91)
Self-Propelled Artillery: 208 (139/46/23)
Towed Artillery: 151 (82/49/2/18)
Multiple Rocket Launchers: 50 (32/9/9)
Aircraft: 69 (68/1)
Helicopters: 32 (27/2/3)

Get the picture? With the exception of aircraft, where losses are quite low on both sides, Russia’s losses are not only substantially higher, they are disproportionately higher. Much like soldiers in the field, the Ukrainian forces have achieved an almost 3:1 to kill-loss ratio. For any army that cannot field three times as many soldiers as the enemy, or three times the armored units, artillery, air support, etc., this rate of attrition is unsustainable!

If I were to summarize everything here in a few bullet points (to give folks a TL:DR option!), it would be that you can’t win a war of attrition if you:

Can’t mobilize your people
Are not united in your efforts
Have poorly supplied and equipped troops
Can’t replace your losses
Have a disproportionate kill-loss ratio

A war of attrition is likely to be lost if merely one of these issues applies. At present, they all apply to Russia. If they were boxes, there would need to be a sixth with the words “All of the Above” next to it. Considering how this war has gone and how it’s going, anyone claiming Russia is going to win is either desperate, painfully uninformed, or a liar pushing a false narrative. From any angle that doesn’t involve willful ignorance or deception, Russia has been losing the war from the beginning.

Neither the passage of time nor the adoption of desperate measures has changed that one bit. If anything, it has only hastened Russia’s strategic, economic, and political problems. At every turn, Putin has publicly shrugged and moved on; but privately, he’s become recluse and paranoid. He’s also made it clear to his people and former allies that he doesn’t care if they live or die, just so long as he doesn’t have to admit defeat. And thanks to Prigozhin’s attempted coup, there’s blood in the water and his weakness as a leader has been exposed.

His attempts to throw bodies at the problem have failed, he is currently hoping Ukrainian forces will exhaust themselves assaulting Russian lines, and his constant threats of nuclear escalation are something he can’t ever deliver on. In addition to being unable to unilaterally “push the button” (because there is none) any attempt to order a nuclear strike would result in a second coup, this time from inside the palace!

“Russia will win the war” became an questionable prediction the moment their “three days to Kyiv” offensive failed horribly. Eighteen months and multiple defeats and national humiliations later, it’s a prediction so asinine that only Kremlin sources and Putin’s cheerleaders are making. As with previous wars, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the corruption, inefficiency, and incompetence of its rulers. What began as an attempt by Putin to hold onto power has become the ticket to his precipitous fall!

Thus concludes the third installment. I have one more to go, where I will address the most insidious and stupid lie of them all: “supporting Ukraine supports escalation!” For those demanding capitulation and Ukraine’s surrender, that one really captures the hypocrisy and stupidity of the Kremlin’s campaign of misinformation! Stay tuned!